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Abstract 
 
   This analysis re-examines the relationship between military spending and economic growth using recent 
advances in panel estimation methods and a large panel dataset. The investigation is able to reproduce many of 
results of the existing literature and to provide a new analysis on the relationship between conflict, corruption, 
natural resources and military expenditure and their direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The 
analysis finds that the impact of military expenditure on growth is generally negative as in the literature, but 
that it is not significantly detrimental for countries facing either higher internal or external threats and for 
countries with large natural resource wealth once corruption levels are accounted for.   
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1. Introduction 
The economic effects of military spending continue to be the subject of considerable debate 
in the literature where the impact of military expenditure is frequently found either to be non-
significant or negative.
1
 How do these effects vary across economies? And what factors drive 
the heterogeneity of military spending effects? These questions continue to be an important 
focus for research as it is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the 
resources it takes up, especially when countries need some level of security to deal with 
internal and external threats inducing positive externalities for the military spending and 
growth relationship. 
This analysis reproduces many of results of the existing literature using recent advances in 
panel estimation methods and a large panel dataset which employs unique data on military 
spending and variety of conflict measures. The investigation shows that the differential 
impact of military expenditure is increasing and significant not only for external threat levels, 
but also internal threat levels. In addition, extending the concept of the resource-conflict link, 
the analysis contributes to the defence literature by showing that the impact of military 
expenditure on growth is less detrimental for countries with large natural resource wealth 
once corruption levels are accounted for. The analysis also addresses the concerns from the 
resource-conflict literature regarding endogenous behaviour of natural resources, with 
findings that suggest a significant positive impact of natural resource wealth on conflict. 
Theoretical literature has allowed the identification of a number of channels through which 
military spending can impact the economy – such as labour, capital, technology, external 
relations, socio-political effects, debt and conflicts (see Dunne and Uye, 2009). The relative 
importance and sign of these effects, as well as the overall impact on growth can only be 
ascertained by empirical analysis. 
An important issue distinguished in empirical literature is the identification problem that 
results from the feature that security threats may influence observed changes in both military 
spending and economic growth. Aizenman and Glick (2006) explain the presence of these 
non-linearities showing that while growth falls with higher levels of military spending, its 
impact is positive in the presence of external threats. 
                                                          
1
 For surveys of the military spending and growth literature see Chan (1987), Dunne (1996, chap. 23), Smith 
(2000), Ram (2003), Smaldone (2006), Dunne and Uye (2009). 
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Another feature that has emerged in the conflict literature is the role of natural resources.
2
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) offered a pioneering empirical contribution finding that resource 
wealth has a positive impact on possibility of conflict, with the main results robust to 
employing alternative measures of resource wealth (notably a measure of resource rents, see 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). 
Although the resource-conflict link is increasingly viewed as a stylized fact in economics and 
political science (see e.g., Ross 2004a; Ron, 2005), the explanations of this evidence are 
mixed. Focussing on the economic roots of conflict, De Soysa (2002), Fearon (2005), Ross 
(2006), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), and Lujala (2009) highlight the role of (legal) oil 
and mineral resource trading. Probability of foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006) and the 
probability of suffering from economic shocks (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005) are other 
explanations as to why resources might be linked to conflict. 
Other explanations of the resource-conflict link arise around political (state-strength) 
perspectives of (potential) rebels as key decision-makers (e.g., Auty, 2004; Dunning, 2005; 
Humpreys, 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). According to this view, resource-rich 
economies tend to suffer from weak state and unaccountable leadership, which is unable or 
unwilling to diversify the economy in order to deliver key public goods. Alternatively, 
resource riches may encourage oppressive regimes, leading to genuine grievances amongst a 
share of the population.
3
  
                                                          
2
 The literature has distinguished between no less than three different dimensions of the “resource curse”: 
resources are associated with (i) slower economic growth, (ii) violent civil conflict, (iii) undemocratic regime 
types. Selected contributions include the following works: On economic growth, refer to Sachs and Warner 
(1995), Mehlum et al. (2006), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and etc. With respect to conflict, refer to Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998, 2004), Ross (2004
a,b
), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), Collier et al. (2009), Lujala (2009). 
Considering regime type (and institutions more broadly), refer to Ross (2001), Leite and Weidmann (2002), 
Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), Bulte et al. (2005) and Caselli and Tesei (2011). Overview articles include 
Rosser (2006), Dixon (2009) and van der Ploeg (2009).  
3
 Standard explanations of civil war advanced by economists and political scientists are greed and grievance. 
The rational choice concept regards civil war as a special form of non-cooperative behaviour. The greed motive 
simply reflects a chance for rebels to enrich themselves; grievance, however, is explained in a behavioural 
context, and underlines relative deprivation, social discrimination and inequality (e.g., due to ethnic and 
religious segregations, see Regan, 2003). Ballantine (2003) has emphasized that the mix of greed and grievance 
can be particularly effective and relevant as an explanation of the onset of war. Ross (2004b) investigates these 
4 
 
Therefore there are many reasons to believe that high levels of resource wealth may generate 
high demand for military protection since the military performs as a premium guard against 
the internal and external risk that a country may face with. In addition, having natural 
resources can also reduce the opportunity costs of increasing military spending and building 
up the military–industrial complex facilitating to strengthen the ability of the military to 
protect the national security and natural resources (Ali et al., 2013; Dunne and Tian, 2013).  
Hence, it is not always easy to distinguish between the various mechanisms connecting 
resources to conflict. On one hand, while the income from resource abundance may serve as 
an incentive for rebellion activity, one may also argue that it proxies for the “effectiveness of 
the state” (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Along with these complications, there is a literature 
that involves resource scarcity, rather than abundance, as a driver of violent conflict (Homer-
Dixon, 1999; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). Another concern in the literature is that 
resource rents, as in Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) may be 
endogenous with respect to conflict.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The methodology and data employed are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the estimation results and Section 4 concludes. 
2.1. Empirical Methodology 
The analysis employs the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed in Arellano 
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach 
has advantage to address the issues of potential biases induced by country specific effects, 
and of joint endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation which is 
especially important here because of the link between military spending and conflict, i.e. if 
military expenditure is reacting to an increased threat of conflict, then the ultimate cause of 
the reduced growth might be the threat of conflict itself rather than the observed military 
expenditure.
4
 Moreover, to ensure that the estimated effect is not driven by the number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
motives, along with other potential conflict triggers. The theoretical foundation of these perspectives may be 
traced back to Grossman (1991) and Hirschleifer (1995). 
4
 Along with coefficient estimates obtained using GMM system estimator, the tables also report three tests of the 
validity of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s (1982) J test of over-identification; and Arellano and 
Bond’s (1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order 
serial correlation, which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that error term is not serially 
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instruments, the analysis employs the “1 lag restriction” technique introduced by Roodman 
(2009) that uses only certain lags instead of all available lags as instruments. The treatment of 
each regressor according to their exogeneity levels is based on upper and lower bound 
conditions (Roodman, 2006). 
The benchmark analysis follows a similar specification used by Aizenman and Glick (2006) 
which provides evidence of a non-linear growth effect of military expenditure, which allows 
the presence of threats to security.
5
 Starting from this benchmark, the analysis confirms the 
presence of conflict risks and government performance as potential sources of positive 
externalities for military spending and growth relationship, and then looks at the interaction 
between military expenditure and natural resources as a channel through conflict, also 
accounting for the potential adverse effect that might be generated by poor governance, 
namely by rent-seeking or corruption activities.    
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the estimated 
model can be written as  
                  yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1milit + θ2milit*Xit + φ'Xit + β'Zit + μt + ξi + εit                (1)  
where y is log of real per capita income, milit is military spending, Xit is the vector of 
variables interacted with military spending expressed as either threat, corruption or natural 
resource wealth, Zit is a vector of additional control variables, μt is a period-specific constant, 
ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, and εit is an error term. 
The hypothesis is that θ1<0 and θ2>0 implying that the impact of military expenditure θ1+ 
θ2*Xit is less negative at high levels of threat, government performance and natural resource 
wealth. Moreover, as θ1 and θ2 have opposite signs, a threshold effect arises:   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
correlated; and AR (2) test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be 
rejected. In addition, to deal with heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 
5
 Dunne et al. (2005) in their critical review paper compare theoretical models mainly employed by defence 
economists. They conclude that the Feder-Ram model should be avoided within the defence economics 
literature, since it is prone to theoretical misinterpretation. The augmented Solow model used by Knight et al. 
(1996) has fewer theoretical weaknesses, but it is too narrow given the range of variables that have been found 
significant determinants of growth. The reformulation of the Barro model used by Aizenman and Glick (2006), 
which allows for security effects on output is more promising and has the comparative advantage to explain both 
military expenditures and output. 
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 = θ1+ θ2*Xit >0    
      
         Xit >     := - 
   
  
 
The standard errors of the respective threshold levels are computed using the delta method. 
However it is of note that in small samples, the delta method is known to result in excessively 
large standard errors. 
As an additional robustness check, outliers are singled out using a strategy advocated by 
Belsley et al. (1980) that involves the application of the DFITS statistic to identify the 
countries associated with high combinations of residual and leverage statistics.  
2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The initial analysis is based on a balanced dynamic panel dataset consisting of 89 countries 
over the 1970-2010 period.
6
 To construct the panel dataset, non-overlapping five year 
intervals are used. This filters out short-run cyclical fluctuations, so that the analysis can 
focus on long-run growth effects (Aghion et al., 2009). The dependent variable, logged per 
capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth, is constructed using data from the Penn World Tables 
(PWT 7.1). Log of initial income per capita is used as regressor. 
Military spending is measured as the average ratio of military expenditures to GDP, using 
data collected from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbooks. 
As online data tables relate only to the period from 1988 onwards, military expenditure 
shares for the previous periods are collected and inputted directly from the SIPRI Yearbooks 
in order to extend the time horizon.
7
 
The degree of threat measure employed is twofold: internal and external. To measure the 
internal threat level, the analysis employs two alternative proxies: internal conflict onset and 
internal conflict incidence. The former is measured as the fitted values of civil conflict onset 
from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The projection of probabilities for onset is realized according 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix Tables B and C for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
7
 Data on military spending was initially collected for 173 countries starting from the period of 1959 as the PWT 
data on real GDP per capita is not available for most countries before this date. However, the time horizon was 
restricted to the period of 1970 and onwards because the measure of natural resources is available only since this 
date. Moreover, in order to maximise the number of countries for which data on military expenditure and real 
GDP per capita is available for most years, the balanced sample was limited to 113 countries. Due to lack of the 
data for other important control variables, the analysis was further constrained to the balanced sample of 89 
countries. 
7 
 
to the specification of their original paper.
8
 The latter is constructed using UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflicts 2012 Dataset of the International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) Centre 
and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), and computed by counting the number of 
internal threat incidences during non-overlapping five year intervals for the period of 1970-
2010. A country’s external threat level is proxied in two ways. First, war instensity measure 
is computed in a similiar way as in Aizenman and Glick (2006) by counting the number of 
wars a country has been involved in conflict for the last half century. Specifically, it is 
defined as the number of years a country was at war with each of its adversaries during the 
period from 1960 to 2010 and divided by the sample period. This variable is constructed 
based on the data of militarized interstate disputes from “Major Episodes of Political 
Violence, 2008” collected by the University of Maryland’s Center for Systematic Peace 
(CSP). A sensitive issue from the estimation of military expenditure and growth relationship 
conditional on war intensity measure is that the estimated effect might be driven by the future 
conflict that a country has not experienced yet at previous time period. Therefore, the analysis 
also employs an alternative measure of external threat incidence which is constructed using 
UCDP/PRIO data; and computed by counting the number of wars a country has been 
involved in conflict during non-overlapping five year intervals for the period of 1970-2010.  
The measure of resource wealth is the resource rent provided by Hamilton and Ruta from the 
World Bank.
9
 It includes two categories of natural resources: minerals and energy (oil, gas 
and coal); and is measured as the product of the quantity of resources extracted and the 
difference between the resource price and the unit cost of extraction. 
Corruption is measured by the control of corruption index extracted from ICRG (International 
Country Risk Guide) data set.
10
 The index has values ranging from a value of 0 (for very high 
corruption or very poor performance) to 6 (for very low corruption or excellent performance) 
and hence may be interpreted as an increasing index of government performance.  
                                                          
8
 More specifically, the predicted values of civil conflict onset from model 2 of Table 1 as in Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) are used. The projection reflects prior war, income, population, mountains and non-contiguous territory, 
oil, new states and political instability, polity2, as well as ethnic and religious fraction. Note that employing the 
civil conflict onset measure restricts the data set to 1970-2000 period.       
9
 See also Collier and Hoeffler (2005), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007). 
10
 Employing corruption data restricts the sample to 82 countries and the time span to the period of 1985-2010.  
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To examine the claim of endogenous behaviour of natural resource wealth on conflict, several 
variables are employed to serve as exogenous instruments. Instrumental variables should be 
exogenous and correlated with the 1
st
 stage endogenous variables, but not with the error term 
of the 2
nd
 stage conflict regression. The instruments employed include three geographical 
variables – distance to major navigable river,11 percentage of fertile soil (soil), and percentage 
of land area in the tropics (tropics).
12
 It is evident that biophysical conditions can affect a 
country’s comparative advantage in exporting primary commodities, and hence its resource 
dependence. Moreover, there is no indication that these instruments invite conflict directly 
and therefore correlate with the 2
nd
 stage error term.
13
  
A further instrument is given by the variable democracy constructed by replacing negative 
values of the variable polity2 in the Polity IV database (Marshall, 2010) with zero. Polity2 is 
widely used in the empirical political-science literature as a measure of the position of a 
country on a continuum of autocracy-democracy spectrum (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2008; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2006, 2009; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008). Although one might 
question the exogeneity of regime type for conflict regressions, the analysis clearly 
demonstrates that this variable may be used as an instrument (see also e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 
2003; Vreeland, 2008). There is also little reason to suspect that democratic system of 
governance leads to more incidents of civil conflict; and more importantly it is questionable 
whether it has a direct effect on conflict potential.
14
  
                                                          
11
 This variable is employed from G-Econ data set collected by Yale University. Source: 
http://gecon.yale.edu/data-and-documentation-g-econ-project 
12
 The geographical characteristics on soil and tropics are obtained from Nunn and Puga (2012). Source: 
http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/ 
13
 The geophysical characteristics most commonly found to influence conflict is the degree of high terrain, 
which is not directly linked to these geographical instruments.    
14
 Using the polity2 measure that ranges from -10 to 10, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find an insignificant impact of 
political regime type on civil conflict onset. However they suggest that anocracies, as defined by the middle of 
the polity index (ranging from -5 to 5) of political regime, are more susceptible to civil conflict than either pure 
democracies or pure dictatorships. Unpacking the anocracy measure, Vreeland (2008) finds that certain 
components of the polity index are defined with explicit reference to civil conflict, and when these components 
are removed from the polity index, the significant relationship between political regime and conflict disappears. 
To check whether the arguments above alter the results, the analysis also used a dummy for democracy that 
takes value of 1 if polity2 is higher than 5 and 0 otherwise as an instrument. The results are qualitatively similar 
to that presented here. Moreover, Sirimaneetham and Temple (2009) demonstrate that instability itself can form 
a binding constraint on a country’s economy, where for the more stable countries, the measures of institutional 
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The analysis also employs a standard set of control variables typically used in the empirical 
growth literature (e.g., Barro and Lee, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch. 12), which 
can be classified as stock and flow variables. Stock variables are measured at the beginning 
of each half decade and consist of two proxies for human capital: the log of average years of 
schooling attained by males aged 15 and over, obtained from Barro and Lee data set; and the 
log of life expectancy, as reported by the United Nations. Flow variables are measured as 
averages over the half-decade. These feature the population growth rate,
15
 real private 
investment as a percentage of real GDP and degree of economic openness, all as reported in 
the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.1). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for shares of military expenditure and natural resources, 
and the cumulative incidence of conflict over the different subsamples. Three features are of 
note for the analysis. The first is the tendency that countries experience internal threat on 
average 8 times more frequently than external threat (8.382 vs. 1.112). This supports the 
claim that the end of proxy-wars and superpower involvement in local wars did not reduce 
the number of conflicts, but did reduce the intensity of military battles (Kaldor, 1999). There 
are fewer real military battles than in the past, but attacks on civilians increased showing a 
dominance of civil or intra-state wars. Furthermore, over 2/3 of the sample never experienced 
any external threat, while this figure is almost the same for those who have experienced 
internal conflict. This might affect the economic impact of military expenditure on growth 
through external and internal conflict. The second facet of these statistics is that conflicts 
occur more frequently in relatively more resource abundant countries. The average natural 
resource shares increases when moving from the sample without any conflict experience to 
the sample with some conflict experience: from 2.391% (4.099%) to 5.608% (5.057%) for 
internal (external) threat. The third aspect is the obvious tendency that countries facing either 
external or internal threat tend to spend relatively more on the military sector compared with 
the sample facing no threat. Average military expenditure share increases when moving from 
the sample without any conflict experience to the sample with some conflict experience: from 
2.479% (2.242%) to 2.980% (4.112%) for internal (external) threat.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
quality have more explanatory power on economic performance, i.e. fundamentals such as good institutions are 
not strongly associated with economic performance unless stability is also in place. 
15
 Growth rate of population employed in the analysis is computed as log of n + g + δ, where n is average 
population growth rate; g is the rate of technical progress and δ is the rate of depreciation of the stock of 
physical capital investment and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05, following Mankiw et al. (1992). 
10 
 
3. Empirical Results 
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on threat levels are 
presented in Table 2. Table 3 displays estimation results for the relationship between military 
spending and growth conditional on corruption levels. Tables 4-11 explore the relationship 
between military spending and growth concentrating on natural resources as a channel 
through conflict. Table 4 addresses the concerns of potential endogeneity problems in 
resource-conflict relationship. The results from the non-linear estimation of the relationship 
between military spending and growth conditional on natural resource wealth are reported in 
Table 5. The subsequent tables report a number of sensitivity checks on the results from 
Table 5. In particular, the analysis explores the robustness of the results to: alternative criteria 
for inclusion of the countries in the sample based on (i) importance of the shares from natural 
resource rents in the economy; (ii) dropping large commodity producers and (iii) subsets of 
countries with relatively intense conflict experiences that might potentially be induced by 
resource abundance; (iv) breaking down the resource wealth by commodity type (energy and 
oil resources); (v) alternative time windows; (vi) allowance for other non-linearities.     
3.1. Military Expenditure and Growth: Threats  
Figure 1 illustrates how the impact of military spending on economic growth changes while 
the level of threat increases. Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of 
interest are achieved using partial regressions.
16
 The plots indicate a significant negative 
impact of military expenditure on growth for the sample with no experience of conflict, while 
this effect is positive, albeit insignificant, for the sample with some conflict experience. 
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure conditional on internal threat levels 
are presented in Table 2.
17
 The conjecture of this investigation follows the idea that the 
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 Partial-regression estimates are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the isolated 
independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. Next, the fitted 
dependent variable is regressed against the fitted independent variable. In each case, the residuals of a growth 
regression on a set of variables are compared with the residuals of military expenditure regression on the same 
variables. The figures are produced using OLS regressions where growth and military expenditure are related 
linearly. 
17
 An analogous analysis of the relationship between military expenditure and growth conditional on external 
threat levels is reported in Appendix Table A1. Overall the results confirm the findings from Aizenman and 
Glick (2006) and demonstrate that this non-linearity is also apparent in a panel setting.   
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impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of the effective militarized 
threat posed by internal and external forces. Alternatively, threats without expenditure for 
military security reduce growth, military expenditure without threats decreases growth, while 
impact of military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large threats would be positive. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of these relationships provide support for the 
conjecture, and indicate that military expenditure has a negative direct effect on growth. The 
coefficients on the interaction term are significant and positive in all cases, implying a 
positive marginal impact of military expenditure in the presence of threats. The coefficient 
estimates on threat measures are mostly negative where significances show sensitivity across 
different specifications. The threshold analysis for the internal threat measure of civil conflict 
onset implies that military spending has an overall negative (positive) effect on growth for 
threat levels below (above) the probability level of 0.032.  
As a check on the results, the growth equation is re-estimated according to the threshold 
levels where the separate linear specifications are estimated for the subsamples below and 
above the threshold level.
18
 The associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation 
increase in military expenditure from splitting the data set into subsamples is estimated as -
0.28 percentage points (significant) among low threat level countries, and -0.01 percentage 
points (insignificant) among high threat level countries.
19
 Thus, these piece-wise linear 
specifications imply a relationship similar to that found in the specification that includes the 
interaction term between military expenditure and threat.  
The last column in Table 2 employs alternative measure for internal threat levels using 
UCDP/PRIO data. The results are qualitatively similar and consistent to that found above. 
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables enter mostly with the expected 
signs. Initial income exhibits a negative relationship with growth. Estimated coefficients on 
life expectancy and the investment ratio are positive, statistically significant, and typically 
indicate strong quantitative effects. Finally, the estimated effect of population growth, trade 
openness and schooling is typically insignificant. 
                                                          
18
 The threshold value of 0.021 is used for the analysis of low and high internal threat sample. However note 
that any threshold value below 0.021 yields qualitatively similar results to that presented in Table 2.  
19
 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by average standard deviation of 2.81, 
dividing by the time span between income observations (5 years), and then multiplying by 100 to convert to a 
percentage-point measurement. 
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As an additional robustness check, the analysis also considered the potential influence of 
several subsets of countries singled out due to the maintenance of high shares of military 
expenditure and on the basis of certain unusual aspects of their conflict experiences during 
the time period spanned by the sample.
20
 Results of this exercise are reported in Appendix 
Tables A2 and A3 where the results provide supportive evidence for the non-linear 
relationship conditional on threat levels as described above. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship between military 
expenditure and growth is only apparent among countries facing low threats, while in the 
presence of sufficiently high threats military expenditure is not significantly detrimental for 
growth, illustrating typically an insignificant impact.  
3.2. Military Expenditure and Growth: Corruption 
Previous studies suggest that the relationship between military expenditure and growth also 
depends on corruption and rent seeking behaviour (see e.g., Gupta et al., 2001; d’Agostino et 
al., 2012). In Table 3, this association is examined more formally, where the hypothesis is 
that military expenditure in the presence of corruption (better government performance) 
reduces (increases) growth. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of this relationship support this hypothesis. 
Military expenditure and corruption are decreasing economic performance directly, while the 
interaction term enters positively, all illustrating a significant impact on growth. The 
associated quantitative significance of one standard deviation increase in military expenditure 
from splitting the data set into subsamples according to the threshold level is estimated as -
0.67 percentage points (significant) among high corruption level countries (those below the 
corruption level of 4.5), and 0.01 percentage points (insignificant) among low corruption 
level countries (those above the level of 4.5).  
As noted by Delavallade (2005), the existence of corruption leads to a re-allocation of 
resources from more productive sectors towards less productive ones. As military spending 
generates more rents, projects in this sector are likely to involve larger amounts of money and 
may attract more and larger bribes. Overall, the magnitude of these results implies that 
corruption leads to increases in military spending, worsening the negative impact of the larger 
military sector on the economy’s growth rate. 
                                                          
20
 See Appendix A for description of additional robustness checks. 
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3.3.1. Military Expenditure and Growth: Natural Resources 
The exploration now turns to relationships between military spending and growth 
concentrating on natural resources as a channel through conflict. As mentioned previously, a 
large body of the literature identifies natural resource wealth as a major determinant of civil 
conflict. The dominant causal link is that resources provide finance and motive (the “state 
prize” model). Others see natural resources as causing “political Dutch disease” or increasing 
rent-seeking and corruption activities, which in turn weaken state capacity leading to a fail of 
delivering key public goods and hence increase conflict possibility.  If this is the case, the 
resource-conflict link is expected to impact the military spending and growth relationship. 
This investigation supposes that if resource wealth is related to a higher risk of conflict, then 
the impact of military expenditure on growth is a non-linear function of natural resource 
wealth. In particular, the impact of military expenditure in the presence of a sufficiently large 
resource wealth would be positive, conditioning that natural resources are not associated with 
high corruption activities. 
Estimation results of the analysis of the resource-conflict link are presented in Table 4. The 
first two columns of the upper panel derives this relationship using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) where civil conflict onset linearly responds to initial income, natural resources and the 
set of control variables as employed in the benchmark analysis. The findings are very similar 
to those found in the existing literature, where all variables of interest take the expected signs. 
Specifically, resource wealth leads to a higher probability of conflict, while a negative 
correlation is apparent for initial income. In both cases, initial income and resource wealth 
illustrate strong quantitative effects on probability of conflict onset. 
In light of the concerns about endogeneity, as argued by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009), 
the next column applies a two-step instrumental variables (IV) model, where initial income 
and natural resources are estimated in the first stage by a simple linear regression, and the 
second stage uses an instrumental variable approach to determine the probability of the 
conflict onset. First-stage regression results, as shown in the lower panel, demonstrate that the 
instruments are strong. The joint endogeneity test from the linear estimation provide support 
for the idea that the variables of interest are jointly endogenous, and that instrumenting for 
these variables is necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of the causal relationship for the 
14 
 
onset of conflict.
21
 The test statistics for the instruments also confirm that they are 
appropriate: over-identification tests (Hansen J test) and the tests on the excluded 
instruments, all performed in linear regressions, show that the instruments are strong and 
properly exogenous.
22
  
The estimation results from the instrumental variables approach imply a qualitatively similar 
relationship to that found in the OLS specifications. Higher incomes attenuate the risk of 
conflict, while resource wealth is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict 
onset. Therefore, returning back to the relationship of military spending and growth 
conditional on resource wealth, the effect from military expenditure and resource interaction 
is expected to be positive. 
The results from the non-linear estimation of this relationship are reported in Table 5. To deal 
with problems that might potentially be induced from association of corruption with natural 
resources and military expenditure, the analysis employs two approaches (see e.g., Leite and 
Weidmann, 2002; Aizenman and Glick, 2006; d’Agostino et al., 2012). Under the first, as 
shown in columns (1) and (2), the specification also includes corruption and its interaction 
with military expenditure in addition to the interaction term between military expenditure and 
natural resources. Under the second (column 3), the growth equation is estimated by 
interacting military expenditure with two separate natural resource variables: one for resource 
wealth for those countries below the corruption level of 4.5 (high corruption), and the other 
for countries above this level (low corruption). 
The estimation results from these alternative approaches provide support for the supposition. 
While military expenditure has a direct significant and negative effect on growth, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms with natural resources are positive, implying a positive 
differential impact of military expenditure. In particular, interaction terms under the first 
approach are significant and robust to the elimination of outliers. For the second approach, 
military expenditure is only significant for the case when it is interacted with resource wealth 
for countries with low corruption levels, and illustrates an insignificant impact for high 
                                                          
21
 Separate endogeneity tests for the variables of interest fail to reject the exogeneity of initial income. However, 
natural resource wealth still enters endogenously. Therefore, the IV equation is also re-estimated by 
instrumenting only for natural resources; the results are qualitatively similar to that presented in Table 4. 
22
 The joint significance test of the instruments fails to reject the null of no explanatory power on conflict. 
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corruption levels, confirming the concerns regarding a potential contradictory effect induced 
by corruption. 
In summary, the findings confirm the idea that resource wealth is related with a higher risk of 
conflict, and show that the impact of military expenditure in the presence of sufficiently large 
resource wealth is positive once corruption levels are accounted for. 
3.3.2. Robustness Checks 
Table 6 examines the robustness of the results estimated for the relationship between military 
spending and growth, conditional on natural resources, to the exclusion of countries whose 
natural resource wealth accounts for only a small share of GDP. For these countries it is 
unlikely that the capacity of resources provides finance or motive to induce a potential 
conflict, so focussing on a smaller sample with significant resource rents share is arguably a 
better test for sensitivity of the results. Columns 1 and 2 exclude countries in the first decile 
of the average share distribution (8 countries); columns 3 and 4 exclude countries in the first 
quartile (18 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude all countries below the median average 
share (39 countries). Results from baseline sample are confirmed and generally reinforced as 
the threshold to be included in the sample progressively increases. In particular, the point 
estimates for the interaction term (columns 2, 4 and 6) become more positive as the analysis 
focuses on more resource dependent countries.  
The potential influence on the results of several additional subsets of countries is also 
considered. The collection of these subsets reflects countries singled out due to their resource 
dependence and conflict experiences during the time period spanned by the sample. The 
results of this exercise are illustrated in Tables 7 and 8. For each subset, Tables 7 and 8 report 
the list of countries, their average shares of natural resource rents, military expenditure and 
growth rates measured over the entire sample period, and the coefficient estimates obtained 
for interaction terms of military spending with natural resources as specified above for the 
first and the second approach. 
Table 7 addresses the plausible concern that high stakes from resource rents might incentivise 
conflict potential and affect motivation for rebels to enrich themselves. The investigation 
therefore excludes from the sample four subsets of countries: (i) those belonging to OPEC; 
(ii) big oil and natural gas producers; (iii) large minerals and coal producers; and (iv) the 
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union of these subsets.
23
 In all cases, the results remain robust at least at the 10% significance 
level with coefficient estimates of the variables of interest lying within one standard deviation 
of the full-sample estimate. 
Table 8 checks the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of countries with relatively 
intense conflict experiences that might potentially be induced by resource wealth. The results 
of this exercise are demonstrated for three subsets of countries: (i) countries with high 
internal threat levels and high natural resource shares specified as those experienced internal 
threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence and with natural resource 
levels above the mean; (ii) countries with high external threat levels and high natural resource 
shares defined as those experienced external threat more than approximately one standard 
deviation from the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence and with natural resource 
levels above the mean; and (iii) the union of these subsets. The coefficient estimates of the 
interaction terms change very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under 
consideration. However, statistical significance of interaction term, as specified under the 
first approach, is somewhat altered in the case when the exclusion of the second and the third 
subsets are employed. Overall, the general pattern of results reported in Table 5 remains 
apparent given the exclusion of these countries from the sample. 
Table 9 deals with the issue of commodity typology. An important distinction that has been 
made in the literature is the role of energy and oil trading as a potential driver of conflict 
(Rosser, 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer, 2007 and etc.), which is believed to induce higher 
risk of conflict, as they are generally more valuable and easier to control for the ruling elite. 
Therefore columns 1-2 and 3-4 break down the resource wealth into energy and oil resources 
respectively. The results from both cases are consistent with findings from Table 5. 
Furthermore, the point estimates of interaction terms provide support to the belief that energy 
and oil resources in particular, are the crucial drivers of the impact of the natural resources on 
the conflict potential as mentioned above.  
                                                          
23
 The investigation treats Indonesia as an OPEC country, as it belonged to the organisation for more than half 
of the sample period. It also includes Ecuador who joined the OPEC in 2007. Alternative treatments of these 
countries do not alter the results. Big commodity producers reflect countries with more than 3% of total world 
supply, belonging to the list of top 10 biggest producers (according to the latest estimates) in the world by 
commodity. Data for commodities produced in a country are obtained from the following sources: minerals 
(bauxite, copper, phosphates, tin, gold, gemstones and etc.) from British Geological Survey 2000-2008; Oil, 
natural gas and coal from US Energy Information Administration 1980-2009. 
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Using time effects in all regressions controls for any common factor that could affect all 
countries in any five-year interval. In addition, the non-linear specification implicitly allows 
for time and cross-country variation in the effect of military expenditure on economic growth. 
However, it would be of interest to check if the results hold when different time windows are 
used for the estimation. The baseline time span in the analysis for natural resource 
contingency is 1985-2010. Table 10 considers more restrictive information under the first 
approach available for four successive periods of minimum 15 years: 1985-2000; 1985-2005; 
1990-2010; 1995-2010. The result holds significantly, at least at the 10% significance level, 
suggesting that the findings from non-linear relationship between military expenditure and 
growth are also robust when the analysis is restricted to different time spans. 
A final robustness check explores the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of additional 
nonlinearities of military expenditure. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 11 where 
columns 1 and 2 add the interactions of military expenditure, respectively, with initial logged 
income and the threat measure of conflict onset into the specification.
24
 In all cases, the 
results remain robust. Moreover, note that all other interactions show a highly significant 
impact and take the correct sign.
25
 
Overall, the findings provide supportive evidence to the general pattern of results reported in 
Table 5 showing robust relationship between military expenditure and growth conditional on 
natural resource wealth. 
 
                                                          
24
 The design of initial income interaction with military expenditure is an approach to place countries into 
income categories (see DeJong and Ripoll, 2006). The evidence of a positive significant interaction term effect 
between military expenditure and initial income arises by differences in the impact of military expenditure on 
growth across different income groups.  
25
 An analogous analysis as in column 2 of Table 11 has been carried by employing military expenditure 
interaction with external instead of internal threat. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported here. 
Furthermore, in addition to investigating the internal and external threats separately as potential sources of 
positive externalities for the non-linear relationship between military spending and growth, the analysis also 
considered including military spending interactions with both type of threats into the model simultaneously. The 
results reveal a significant interaction effect of military spending only with internal threats. This is consistent 
with Kaldor’s (1999) argument that the change in the nature of conflicts after the end of Cold-War era led to 
important changes in the frequency of civil or intra-state wars, illustrating dominance of internal conflicts over 
external conflicts (see Table 1). However this is not to argue that the role of external threats as a source of 
positive externality for the military spending and growth relationship should be underestimated. 
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4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis has confirmed that military expenditure in the presence of high 
external threats increases economic growth, while military expenditure driven by rent seeking 
and corruption reduces growth. In addition, the analysis provides evidence that such non-
linearity is also apparent when internal threats are considered. Extending the concept of the 
resource-conflict link, the analysis also contributes to the defence literature showing that 
military expenditure is less detrimental for countries with large natural resource wealth as 
long as the resource wealth is not associated with high corruption activities. 
The empirical research was constrained by the limited availability of data for some countries 
(e.g., for Arab Gulf countries, former Soviet Union countries), inducing the analysis to 
concentrate on relatively limited country sample. Therefore there is no obvious way to deal 
with the robustness constraints imposed by the limitations of the sample. Hence, the results 
should be taken as a suggestive of the deeper structure linking military expenditure, conflict, 
natural resource wealth and growth.  
The analysis also suggests a number of paths for future research concerning the effect of 
military activity on economic growth through natural resource wealth. Various channels by 
which natural resources can influence the economy have been discussed in the literature. A 
particularly promising avenue of future research would be to analyze the role of political 
factors, such as degree of political stability, and the political orientation of the government. 
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Figure 1: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness 
and schooling, and time fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Military Expenditure, Natural Resources and Conflict  
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full sample Mil. exp. 89 2.789 2.189 0.281 14.964 
 Natural res. 89 4.379 6.946 0 38.969 
 Ext. Threat 89 1.112 3.009 0 16 
 Int. Threat 89 8.382 11.888 0 45 
Internal Threat 
No Conflict  Mil. exp. 34 2.479 1.876 0.281 11.247 
 Natural res. 34 2.391 3.897 0 13.827 
Conflict  Mil. exp. 55 2.980 2.357 0.549 14.964 
 Natural res. 55 5.608 8.082 0 38.969 
External Threat 
No Conflict  Mil. exp. 63 2.242 1.132 0.281 4.836 
 Natural res. 63 4.099 7.206 0 38.969 
Conflict  Mil. exp. 26 4.112 3.334 0.933 14.964 
 Natural res. 26 5.057 6.355 0 26.112 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on cross sectional averages for the 1970-2010 period. Internal and external threat measures 
represent cumulative sum of the conflict incidences over the whole sample constructed using UCDP/PRIO data. 
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Table 2 
Military Expenditure and Internal Threat  
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 Internal threat: Onset Internal  
Threat 
Incidence 
 Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Level of Threat 
 Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
Mil*Threat 0.130** 
(0.062) 
0.205** 
(0.097) 
  0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
Threat -0.159 
(0.106) 
-0.459 
(0.308) 
0.323 
(0.284) 
-0.333* 
(0.164) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.009 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.037) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.139*** 
(0.045) 
0.148*** 
(0.054) 
0.148** 
(0.062) 
0.184*** 
(0.038) 
0.123*** 
(0.042) 
Investment/GDP 0.152*** 
(0.034) 
0.145*** 
(0.037) 
0.120*** 
(0.041) 
0.072*** 
(0.017) 
0.219*** 
(0.049) 
Openness (log) -0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
Schooling (log) -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
Observations 517 478 419 64 665 
Threshold Analysis 
Internal Threat 
0.027 
(0.0004) 
0.032 
(0.001) 
  4.39 
(3.35) 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.990 0.994 0.700 0.872 0.798 
(b) Serial Corr.:      
     First-order 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.212 0.000 
     Second-order 0.916 0.745 0.779 0.247 0.190 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on the probability of internal conflict 
onset, respectively, with and without outliers. Columns 3 and 4 apply the alternative approach to estimate the impact of military expenditure 
for countries with high and low internal threat levels. Column 5 employs UCDP/PRIO data to measure for internal threat incidence instead 
of conflict onset. All specifications control for time fixed effects. The excluded countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Egypt, Israel, 
Mali, Korea Rep. and Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, Israel, Korea Rep., Mali and Singapore; in column 4 are China and Uganda; 
and in column 5 are Botswana, China, Egypt and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent 
significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Military Expenditure and Corruption 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 
Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Level of Corruption 
Low High 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
  
Corruption -0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.008 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.028) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.105*** 
(0.033) 
0.099** 
(0.044) 
0.187* 
(0.092) 
0.143*** 
(0.047) 
Investment/GDP 0.260*** 
(0.042) 
0.247*** 
(0.048) 
0.175*** 
(0.046) 
0.355*** 
(0.062) 
Openness (log) -0.024*** 
(0.008) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.043** 
(0.011) 
Schooling (log) -0.003 
(0.009) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.042** 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
Observations 404 384 72 307 
Threshold Analysis 
Corruption (0-6) 
4.3 
(1.89) 
4.5 
(2.25) 
  
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.654 0.634 0.792 0.824 
(b) Serial Corr.:     
     First-order 0.001 0.003 0.032 0.004 
     Second-order 0.546 0.622 0.389 0.741 
Note: The excluded countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Uganda. Eliminated countries from low corruption level 
sample are Australia and Finland, while from high corruption level sample are China, Mozambique and Uganda. The estimates reported in 
columns 3 and 4 are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications control for time fixed 
effects. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Natural Resources and Civil Conflict Onset 
Dependent Variable: Probablity of Civil Conflict Onset 
 OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Natural Res. 0.061** 
(0.027) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.063** 
(0.028) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 517 506 494 
R-squared 0.243 0.343  
Joint exogeneity p   0.044 
Instrument overid p   0.892 
Exc. inst. F- Initial GDP p.c.   31.07 
Exc. inst. F- Nat. Res.   12.53 
First stage results for instruments 
 
(1) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 
(2) 
Natural Res. 
 
Dist. to major river 
-0.049*** 
(0.018) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
 
Soil 
-0.621*** 
(0.142) 
-0.100*** 
(0.016) 
 
Tropical 
-0.428*** 
(0.074) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
 
Democracy, lagged 
0.046*** 
(0.008) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 estimates economic growth specification, respectively, with and without outliers. Column 3 applies instrumental 
variables approach using the specification as in column 2. In addition to variables of interest reported in the upper panel, all specifications 
control for military expenditure ratio, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and 
time fixed effects. The excluded countries are China and Israel. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent 
significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 5 
Military Expenditure and Natural Resources 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Corruption 
 Main  
Model 
Outliers  
Removed 
Alternative 
 Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Natural Res. -0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.019 
(0.034) 
 
Mil*Nat 0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
 
Natural Reshigh   0.014 
(0.066) 
Natural Reslow   -0.531** 
(0.222) 
Mil*Nathigh   0.016 
(0.031) 
Mil*Natlow   0.269** 
(0.133) 
Corruption -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Pop. growth (log) -0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
0.028 
(0.027) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.112*** 
(0.030) 
0.112** 
(0.042) 
0.159*** 
(0.053) 
Investment/GDP 0.233*** 
(0.042) 
0.225*** 
(0.047) 
0.316*** 
(0.062) 
Openness (log) -0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.004 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
Observations 404 384 389 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.978 0.986 0.820 
(b) Serial Corr.:    
     First-order 0.001 0.004 0.002 
     Second-order 0.361 0.461 0.985 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report the estimation results, respectively, with and without outliers under the first estimation approach. Column 3 
employs the second estimation approach using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009) and removing outliers. All 
specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Uganda; in column 3 
are China, Mozambique and Uganda. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Excluding Low Natural Resource Share Countries  
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
  Above 1st Decile Share Above 1st Quartile Share Above Median Share 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
[0.102] 
-0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
Natural Res. -0.019 
(0.040) 
 -0.050 
(0.032) 
 -0.027 
(0.027) 
 
Mil*Nat 0.029* 
(0.016) 
 0.031** 
(0.012) 
 0.018 
(0.011) 
[0.112] 
 
Natural Reshigh  0.028 
(0.065) 
 0.026 
(0.064) 
 -0.032 
(0.068) 
Natural Reslow  -0.501** 
(0.208) 
 -0.561** 
(0.222) 
 -0.777** 
(0.292) 
Mil*Nathigh  0.004 
(0.033) 
 0.001 
(0.033) 
 0.021 
(0.029) 
Mil*Natlow  0.295** 
(0.132) 
 0.319** 
(0.140) 
 0.409** 
(0.167) 
Corruption -0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.006* 
(0.003) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 364 364 314 314 210 210 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.846 0.903 0.880 0.984 1.000 0.398 
(b) Serial Corr.:       
     First-order 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
     Second-order 0.416 0.630 0.515 0.711 0.938 0.570 
Note: Columns 1 and 2 exclude the countries below the 1st decile of natural resource rents as a share of GDP (8 countries); columns 3 and 4 
exclude countries below the 1st quartile (18 countries); and columns 5 and 6 exclude countries below the median (39 countries). All 
specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed 
effects as an additional control set.  ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses; estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 7 
Excluding Big Producers  
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Average  
Nat. Resource 
 Share 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove OPEC Countries 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Ecuador 13.83 2.19 1.77 Mil*Nat 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 0.026 0.011 0.024 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 Mil*Natlow 
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50 0.230 0.116 0.051 
Remove Big Oil and Gas Producers 
Brazil 2.02 1.52 2.29    
Canada 3.78 1.78 1.88 Mil*Nat 
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 0.022 0.011 0.046 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 Mil*Natlow 
Mexico 6.89 0.55 1.93 0.205 0.103 0.051 
United States 1.64 5.37 1.68    
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50    
Remove Big Minerals and Coal Producers 
Australia 3.87 2.49 2.28    
Bolivia 10.73 2.36 0.44    
Botswana 1.78 3.32 5.75 Mil*Nat 
Chile 9.85 4.16 2.29 0.022 0.012 0.064 
Jamaica 5.58 0.82 0.66 Mil*Natlow 
Jordan 0.67 11.25 -0.02 0.267 0.121 0.030 
Morocco 1.49 4.11 2.38    
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Zambia 13.51 2.73 -0.27    
Remove All Subsets 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Australia 3.87 2.49 2.28    
Bolivia 10.73 2.36 0.44    
Botswana 1.78 3.32 5.75    
Brazil 2.02 1.52 2.29    
Canada 3.78 1.78 1.88    
Chile 9.85 4.16 2.29    
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 Mil*Nat 
Ecuador 13.83 2.19 1.77 0.021 0.009 0.037 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlow 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.193 0.114 0.094 
Jamaica 5.58 0.82 0.66    
Mexico 6.89 0.55 1.93    
Morocco 1.49 4.11 2.38    
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
United States 1.64 5.37 1.68    
Venezuela 26.15 1.75 0.50    
Zambia 13.51 2.73 -0.27    
Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 5. Big 
commodity producers reflect countries with more than 3% of total world supply which belong to the list of top 10 biggest producers in the 
world by commodity. Data for commodities produced in a country are obtained from the following sources: minerals (bauxite, copper, 
phosphates, tin, gold, gemstones and etc.) from British Geological Survey 2000-2008; Oil, natural gas and coal from US Energy Information 
Administration 1980-2009.  
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Table 8 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Average  
Nat. Resource 
 Share 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Countries with High Internal Threat Levels 
and High Natural Res. Shares  
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
Colombia 4.97 2.31 2.39 Mil*Nat 
Congo Dem. Rep. 7.37 2.24 -3.59 0.026 0.012 0.039 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlow 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.218 0.102 0.035 
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Sudan 4.30 3.00 0.99    
Remove Countries with High External Threat Levels 
and High Natural Res. Shares 
China 7.34 1.73 6.90 Mil*Nat 
    0.022 0.014 0.106 
Egypt 12.64 8.66 3.04 Mil*Natlow 
    0.217 0.107 0.046 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89    
Remove All Subsets 
Algeria 19.51 2.57 1.28    
China 7.34 1.73 6.90    
Colombia 4.97 2.31 2.39    
Congo Dem. Rep. 7.37 2.24 -3.59 Mil*Nat 
Egypt 12.64 8.66 3.04 0.022 0.015 0.138 
Indonesia 10.31 2.34 4.19 Mil*Natlow 
Iran 26.11 4.69 0.89 0.217 0.103 0.039 
Peru 6.41 3.05 1.28    
Sudan 4.30 3.00 0.99    
Note: The estimates are achieved according to specifications under the first and the second estimation approach as in Table 5. Countries with 
high internal threat levels and high natural resource shares are specified as those experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative 
internal conflict incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. Countries with high external threat levels and high natural resource 
shares are specified as those experienced external threat more than 1 standard deviation from the mean of cumulative external conflict 
incidence with natural resource levels above the mean. 
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Table 9 
Typologies of Commodities 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 Energy Resources Oil Resources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.016** 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Energy res. -0.073 
(0.050) 
   
Oil res.   -0.050 
(0.056) 
 
Mil*Energy 0.051*** 
(0.017) 
   
Mil*Oil   0.041** 
(0.019) 
 
Energyhigh  -0.145 
(0.092) 
  
Energylow  -0.714*** 
(0.262) 
  
Oilhigh    -0.043 
(0.066) 
Oillow    -0.540** 
(0.225) 
Mil* Energyhigh  0.068** 
(0.030) 
  
Mil* Energylow  0.404** 
(0.157) 
  
Mil* Oilhigh    0.036 
(0.025) 
Mil* Oillow    0.279** 
(0.121) 
Corruption -0.002 
(0.004) 
 -0.003 
(0.004) 
 
Mil*Corr 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 404 404 365 365 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.745 0.699 0.976 0.954 
(b) Serial Corr.:     
     First-order 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
     Second-order 0.530 0.583 0.403 0.456 
Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time 
fixed effects as an additional control set. The estimates are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). ***, 
**, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
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Table 10 
Different Time Windows 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 1985-2000 
(1) 
1985-2005 
(2) 
1990-2010 
(3) 
1995-2010 
(4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Natural Res. -0.209* 
(0.124) 
-0.102** 
(0.048) 
-0.017 
(0.031) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
Mil*Nat 0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.025* 
(0.015) 
Corruption -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Mil*Corr 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 240 322 404 322 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.181 0.997 0.978 0.967 
(b) Serial Corr.:     
     First-order 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.002 
     Second-order N/A 0.961 0.371 0.400 
Note: All specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time 
fixed effects as an additional control set. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 11 
Allowance for Other Non-linearities 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 (1) (2) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.037*** 
(0.008) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
Natural Res. -0.015 
(0.035) 
-0.151* 
(0.090) 
Mil*Nat 0.028** 
(0.014) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
Corruption -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Mil*Corr 0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Mil*GDP 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Threat  -1.276*** 
(0.399) 
Mil*Threat  0.439*** 
(0.119) 
Control Set Yes Yes 
Observations 384 222 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.985 0.587 
(b) Serial Corr.:   
     First-order 0.003 0.005 
     Second-order 0.709 N/A 
Note: Both columns are estimated removing outlier countries. Eliminated countries in column 1 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and 
Uganda; in column 2 are Botswana, China, Mozambique and Sudan. Column 2 employs probability of civil war onset as threat measure. All 
specifications employ log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed 
effects as an additional control set. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Robustness Checks for Threat Levels Analysis 
Beyond the robustness checks described in Tables 2 and A1 for the analysis conditional on 
threat levels, special attention is paid to the potential influence on the results of several 
subsets of countries. The collection of these subsets features countries singled out due to the 
maintenance of high shares of military expenditure and on the basis of certain unusual aspects 
of their conflict experiences during the time period spanned by the sample. Results of this 
exercise are reported in Tables A2 and A3 for four subsets of countries: (i) high military 
expenditure share countries, specified as those which spend more than approximately one 
standard deviation from the mean in military sector; (ii) countries with high level of threat, 
defined as those experienced threat more than approximately three standard deviations from 
the mean of cumulative conflict incidence; (iii) the poorest countries with high military 
expenditure shares and high levels of threat, stipulated as those are in the bottom of income 
distribution, which spend more than average in the military sector and experienced an 
external threat above the mean of cumulative conflict incidence;
26
 and (iv) the union of these 
subsets. For each subset, Table A2 and A3 report the list of countries, the cumulative number 
of threat incidences during the time period spanned by the sample, their average military 
expenditure shares and growth rates measured over the entire sample period, and the 
coefficient estimates obtained for the interaction of military spending with threat given their 
removal from the sample in addition to outlier countries. For ease of comparison, the 
estimates obtained given the exclusion of the outlier countries, are also reported. 
The coefficient estimates of the interaction term with internal and external threat incidence 
change very little given the removal of any one of the subsets under consideration; and 
generally, enter significantly at conventional levels. For both cases, the estimates obtained 
given the removal of each subsample lie within approximately one standard deviation of the 
estimate when the potential outliers are removed. Statistical significance in the case when 
military expenditure is interacted with internal conflict onset also changes very little, 
indicating strong qualitative effects. What does change somewhat is the magnitude of the 
                                                          
26
 The cut-off level for countries in the bottom of income distribution is taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), 
where country classifications are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the World Bank’s 
income measures into the corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting definition is specified as 
those with real per capita GDP level less than $2,650.  
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coefficient estimates of the interaction term when the third and the fourth subsets are 
excluded. The significance of the coefficient estimates of the interaction term with war 
intensity also exhibits sensitivity to the exclusion of particular subsets, with the magnitude of 
estimates lying within approximately two standard deviations of the estimate given the 
exclusion of potential outliers.  
Overall, these findings suggest that the negative and significant relationship is only apparent 
among countries facing low threats, while in the presence of sufficiently high threats military 
expenditure is not materially detrimental for growth. 
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Table A1 
Military Expenditure and External Threat 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
 External threat: War intensity External  
Threat 
Incidence 
 Main 
Model 
Outliers 
Removed 
Alternative  
Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Mil*Threat 0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
 0.0025* 
(0.0014) 
Mil*High Threat   -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Mil*Low Threat   -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 
Threat 0.019 
(0.045) 
-0.062 
(0.064) 
0.016 
(0.041) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.0067) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.088*** 
(0.012) 
0.088*** 
(0.013) 
0.087*** 
(0.013) 
0.044** 
(0.022) 
Investment/GDP 0.111*** 
(0.013) 
0.097*** 
(0.013) 
0.099*** 
(0.013) 
0.156*** 
(0.021) 
Openness (log) -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Schooling (log) -0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
No. Observations 695 665 665 665 
Threshold Analysis 
Threat 0.376 
(0.064) 
0.144 
(0.006) 
 2.23 
(2.74) 
Note: Columns 1 estimates military expenditure and economic growth relationship conditional on war intensity levels, while column 2 runs 
the same exercise excluding the potential outlier countries. Column 3 applies the alternative approach to estimate the impact of military 
expenditure for countries with different threat levels by interacting military expenditure with two separate dummy variables: one for 
countries facing low threats, and the other for countries with high threat levels where the average threshold value of 0.260 ((0.376+0.144)/2) 
is used for the analysis. Column 4 employs an alternative external threat incidence measure constructed using UCDP/PRIO data. The 
analysis of military expenditure and growth relationship conditional on external threat levels using GMM estimator demonstrates marginally 
insignificant impact for the interaction terms. Therefore column 4 reports Fixed effect estimates for the analysis of non-linear relationship 
conditional on external threat incidence following the majority of research analyses in the defence literature. Since the external threat 
measure of war intensity by construction is constant over time within a country, and thus is dropped when FE estimator is used, columns 1-3 
employ seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) estimator instead of FE for the analysis of non-linear relationship conditional on war 
intensity levels. All specifications control for time fixed effects. Eliminated countries in column 2 are Botswana, China, Israel, and 
Singapore; in column 3 are Botswana, China, Egypt, and Singapore; and in column 4 are Botswana, China, Egypt, Israel, Korea Rep. and 
Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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Table A2 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country No. of 
 Internal threat 
Incidence 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 0 3.32 5.75    
China 0 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04 0.251 0.141 0.078 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Korea Rep. 0 3.85 5.47 0.0019 0.0009 0.043 
Mali 5 2.19 1.79    
Singapore 0 4.61 5.27    
Remove High Military Exp. Share Countries 
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 0.351 0.147 0.020 
Jordan 0 11.25 -0.02 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Syria 5 9.05 1.48 0.0029 0.0009 0.002 
United States 9 5.37 1.68    
Remove High Internal Threat Level Countries 
Colombia 45 2.31 2.39 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
    0.252 0.139 0.075 
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
    0.0018 0.0009 0.052 
Philippines 42 1.66 1.51    
Remove Poorest Countries with High Military Exp. Shares 
and High Internal Threat Levels 
    Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Mozambique 16 4.76 1.21 0.493 0.207 0.019 
    Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0023 0.0011 0.060 
Remove All Subsets 
Colombia 45 2.31 2.39    
Egypt 6 8.66 3.04    
Israel 45 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Onset) 
Jordan 0 11.25 -0.02 0.603 0.195 0.003 
Mozambique 16 4.76 1.21 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0032 0.0013 0.012 
Philippines 42 1.66 1.51    
Syria 5 9.05 1.48    
United States 9 5.37 1.68    
Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial income, internal threat (either onset or incidence 
measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. High 
military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in military sector. 
High internal threat level countries are specified as those experienced internal threat more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of 
cumulative internal conflict incidence. The poorest countries with high military expenditure shares and high external threat levels are 
specified as those are in the bottom of income distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in 
military sector and experienced internal threat above the mean of cumulative internal conflict incidence. The estimation results are achieved 
using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009).  
39 
 
Table A3 
Exclusion of Countries with Unusual Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: Fixed Effects Estimator 
Country No. of 
 external threat 
incidence 
Average  
Mil. Exp. 
 Share 
Average 
Growth  
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 0 3.32 5.75    
China 12 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04 0.047 0.015 0.002 
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Korea Rep. 0 3.85 5.47 0.0025 0.0014 0.078 
Singapore 0 4.61 5.27    
Remove High Military Exp. Share Countries 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04    
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Jordan 1 11.25 -0.02 0.011 0.019 0.596 
Syria 2 9.05 1.48 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
United States 3 5.37 1.68 0.0027 0.0015 0.071 
Remove High External Threat Level Countries 
China 12 1.73 6.90 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
India 16 2.97 3.48 0.084 0.019 0.000 
Iran 10 4.69 0.89 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 0.0036 0.0019 0.067 
Remove Poorest Countries with High Military Exp. Shares 
and High External Threat Levels 
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
India 16 2.97 3.48 0.035 0.017 0.043 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Syria 2 9.05 1.48 0.0035 0.0018 0.050 
Remove All Subsets 
China 12 1.73 6.90    
Egypt 4 8.66 3.04    
India 16 2.97 3.48 Mil*Threat (Intensity) 
Iran 10 4.69 0.89 0.075 0.136 0.579 
Israel 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*Threat (Incidence) 
Jordan 1 11.25 -0.02 0.0035 0.0022 0.113 
Pakistan 15 4.99 2.34    
Syria 2 9.05 1.48    
United States 3 5.37 1.68    
Note: In addition to variables of interest reported above, all specifications control for initial income, external threat (either intensity or 
incidence measure), log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed 
effects. High military expenditure share countries are specified as those which spend more than 1 standard deviation from the mean in 
military sector. High external threat level countries are specified as those experienced external threat more than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence. The poorest countries with high military expenditure shares and high external threat 
levels are specified as those are in the bottom of income distribution (income rank 1) which spend more than average in military sector and 
experienced external threat above the mean of cumulative external conflict incidence.    
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Appendix B: List of Countries 
 
Code Country Code Country Code Country 
1 Algeria 31 Greece 61 Pakistan 
2 Argentina 32 Guatemala 62 Panama 
3 Australia 33 Guyana 63 Papua New Guinea 
4 Austria 34 Honduras 64 Paraguay 
5 Bangladesh 35 Hungary 65 Peru 
6 Belgium 36 India 66 Philippines 
7 Bolivia 37 Indonesia 67 Portugal 
8 Botswana 38 Iran 68 Rwanda c 
9 Brazil 39 Ireland 69 Senegal 
10 Burundi c 40 Israel 70 Sierra Leone 
11 Cameroon 41 Italy 71 Singapore 
12 Canada 42 Jamaica 72 South Africa 
13 Central African Rep. c 43 Jordan 73 Spain 
14 Chile 44 Kenya 74 Sri Lanka 
15 China 45 Korea, Rep. of 75 Sudan 
16 Colombia 46 Liberia 76 Sweden 
17 Congo, Dem. Rep. 47 Malawi 77 Switzerland 
18 Congo, Rep. of 48 Malaysia 78 Syria 
19 Costa Rica 49 Mali 79 Thailand 
20 Cote d’Ivoire 50 Mauritania c 80 Togo 
21 Cyprus 51 Mauritius c 81 Tunisia 
22 Ecuador 52 Mexico 82 Turkey 
23 Egypt 53 Morocco 83 Uganda 
24 El Salvador 54 Mozambique 84 United Kingdom 
25 Fiji c 55 Nepal c 85 United States 
26 Finland 56 Netherlands 86 Uruguay 
27 France 57 New Zealand 87 Venezuela 
28 Gambia 58 Nicaragua 88 Zambia 
29 Germany 59 Niger 89 Zimbabwe 
30 Ghana 60 Norway   
Note: Subscripts c represent countries those are excluded from the analysis when the corruption variable is employed. 
 
 
Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. (log)  801 8.32 1.33 4.77 10.82 
GDP per capita growth rate  796 0.02 0.03 -0.36 0.19 
Military Expenditure over GDP (%) 778 2.81 2.81 0 28.62 
Natural Resource Rents 797 0.04 0.08 0 0.64 
Energy Resource Rents  797 0.03 0.08 0 0.64 
Oil Rents  667 0.03 0.07 0 0.64 
Population Growth rate 801 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.14 
Real Investment ratio 801 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.72 
Life Expectancy (log) 801 4.13 0.19 3.16 4.40 
Schooling (log) 801 1.61 0.67 -1.24 2.57 
Openness (log) 801 3.99 0.62 2.21 6.06 
War Intensity 799 0.01 0.04 0 0.29 
External Conflict Incidence 801 0.12 0.56 0 5 
Internal Conflict Incidence 801 0.93 1.75 0 5 
Cumulative Incidence of Ext. Conflict 801 1.11 2.99 0 16 
Cumulative Incidence of Int. Conflict 801 8.38 11.83 0 45 
Dist. to major navigable river (    km) 783 1.55 1.33 0.001 9.1 
Soil 801 0.37 0.21 0 0.98 
Tropical 801 0.43 0.45 0 1.00 
Democracy 799 4.84 4.29 0 10 
Polity2 799 2.58 7.15 -10 10 
Probability of civil conflict onset 618 0.013 0.032 0 0.327 
Corruption 491 3.16 1.40 0 6 
Note: Descriptive statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1970-2010 and a sample of 89 countries, except the last 
two. Summary of civil conflict onset probability is restricted to the period of 1970-2000. Respective statistics of corruption are summarized 
for 82 countries data set over the period of 1985-2010.  
 
